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During 2004, political stability of Chad was undermined by the Darfur crisis in neigh-
bounng Sudan, and continued uncertainty about the revenues from oil exploitation. Both 
tssues were said to he at the origin of an attempted coup d 'etat in May. Rumours about the 
poor health of President Idriss Deby fuelled concerns about political stability. An amend-
ment to the constitution that cleared the way for President Deby to stand for re-election after 
his second term was accepted m parliament. Foreign support for the current regime, 
mainly from France and the US, was still strong, since Deby seemed to be the only guar-
antee of political stability, the oppositiOn being in disarray. The exploitation of oil is said 
to have increased GDP by more than 30%. Despite oil revenues, Chad still ranked as one 
of the poorest countries in the world, with 80% of the population living on less than$ 1 a 
day. The rainy season finished early and harvests were far below (30%) the levels oflast 
year. Furthermore, the transhumance of livestock keepers to the south started as early as 
September instead of December, increasing tensions between nomadi9 herders and farm-
ers. The damage done by locust plagues was relatively modest. However, there are indica-
tions that Chad 1s heading for a food crisis in 2005. 
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Domestic Politics 
The Chadian government faced a formidable political challenge in 2004 in the form of the 
Darfur crisis and the spill-over of this conflict into Chad. President Deby took a neutral 
position towards the conflict, despite the fact that his fellow Zaghawa clansmen on the 
Sudanese side of the border were among the people butchered by the Janjaweed militia in 
Darfur. Relatives of Deby were also prominent members of the rebel groups in the area, 
such as the founder and president of JEM (Justice and Equality Movement), K.halil lbrahtm. 
The military and civilian leadership was mostly from the Zaghawa tribe and many blamed 
Deby for not doing enough to help the Sudanese Zaghawa in Darfur. 
Opposition was also fuelled by President Deby's bid for a third presidential term. 
Though there was resistance from opposition parties, the Chadian parliament approved a 
constitutional amendment in May, which allowed him to seek more than the two presi-
dential terms currently allowed. This constitutional amendment still has to be approved by 
the population in a referendum in June 2005. Though the official political opposttion has 
long been dtvided and was unable to mobilise the population, internal opposition dtd grad-
ually mount. A large number of opposition parties took a united stand in thts political 
conflict and Chad's ambassador to the US, Ahmat Hassaballah Soubiane, stepped down and 
associated himself with opposition movements in the Sudan. 
The beginning of oil production and oil exports - started in June this year through the 
World Bank-financed Cameroon-Chad pipeline - is said to have fuelled the power strug-
gle in N'Djamena. Revenues from Chad's Doba oil fields were to be pnmarily channelled 
towards fighting poverty and improving infrastructure in accordance with deals struck wtth 
the World Bank. However, the armed forces, traditionally powerful in Chad, were allocated 
few of the extra revenues from the new export commodity. As oil revenues began to reach 
the country's fiscal authorities, army offictals became increasingly disgruntled about the 
poor conditions in army barracks. Furthermore, opponents ofDeby argued that he was too 
inclined to take direction from international donors and did too little for his own people. 
Dissatisfaction with Deby's handling of the Darfur crisis, the constitutional change he 
proposed, and the management of oil revenues informed discontent within the president's 
closest circles. The expulsion of two Darfur rebel sympathisers from N'Djamena and sup-
port for Sudanese politics in the Darfur crisis triggered the attempted coup d'etat against 
the De by regime on 16 May. The coup did not succeed, but it took days of intense negoti-
ations between insurgents and forces loyal to Deby to end the confrontation. However, the 
changes in high places that he made after the conflict indicated that the danger was com-
ing from very close to him. Tom Herdimi, advisor to Deby and his cousin (both belong to 
the Btdeyat clan) was removed from his post as coordinator of the oil project and replaced 
by the former Prime Mimster Haroun Kabadi in June. Herdimi 's twin brother, Ttmane, was 
removed from his post as president of the executive board of the important parastatal 
'Societe Cotonniere du Tchad' (Cotontchad). Above all, senior officers in the army and the 
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secret police were replaced by people loyal to Deby. However, all these newcomers were 
also from the Zaghawa ethnic group. Moussa Fald Mahamat remained in his post as prime 
minister, though there was growing friction between him and President Deby. 
These measures did little to end the tense situation, despite the fact that Deby took a 
harder position on the Darfur conflict. After this incident, the armed forces carried out sev-
eral operations against suspected coup plotters. Security measures around the president 
were stepped up and it was reported that Deby look-alikes, surrounded by bodyguards, were 
spotted travelling on government planes in an apparent attempt to sow confusion about his 
whereabouts. 
As his hold over the country seemed more threatened, Deby spent more and more time 
in the town of Abeche in the east of Chad, where the security situation deteriorated in 2004 
as a consequence of the Darfur crisis. In June, 180,000 refugees were registered, in 
August, the number increased to 200,000 and refugees were still arriving in December. 
Eleven camps were created by December along the Chad-Sudan border. An additional prob-
lem was that, along with the refugees, an estimated 2.5 m head oflivestock had spilled over 
the border. There was increasing concern that the dynamics of the Darfur conflict between 
nomadic herders and sedentary farmers would also spread to Chad, where inter-group rela-
tions were already tense following violent conflicts between nomadic pastoralists, who for 
decades have moved from north to south, and sedentary farmers over damaged fields and 
the management of wells and pasture lands. 
In the south, clashes took place between groups of various ethnic and religious back-
grounds (Muslim and non-Muslim) and destabilised the political situation. In March, Arab 
Missirie raided a village of the local Sara population in Mandoul department and seized 
large numbers oflivestock, leaving 21 people dead and 28 wounded. In November 2004, 
ethnic fighting occurred between rival mobs of Muslim and non-Muslim residents of the 
south Chadian town ofBebedjia (35 kilometres from the oil-producing area ofDoba), leav-
ing 12 people dead and 16 injured. This incident started as a dispute between a trader 
and a customer. Similar eruptions of violence were regularly reported from other regions 
as well. 
Foreign Affairs 
The Darfur conflict dominated foreign affairs. Initially Chad took a neutral stance and 
opted for a role as intermediary in the conflict, supposedly, in part to please France and the 
US. Idriss De by had already hosted peace negotiations in 2003 and again in April. However, 
the ceasefire agreements proved to be not worth the paper on which they were written. Over 
time, the position ofDeby had become very difficult: he had to maintain a precarious bal-
ance between his fellow Zaghawa, who live on both sides of the border, and the Arabs, who 
are also strongly represented in both countries. On the one hand, for lack of military capac-
ity, Deby could not afford a dispute with Sudan over Darfur. On the other hand, he lacked 
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support among the Chadian population to fight for Zaghawa interests on both sides of the 
border after the group became increasingly unpopular. A further complicating aspect was 
that it was the current president of Sudan, Omar Hassan al-Bashir, who helped Deby come 
to power 14 years earlier by allowing him to organise his rebellion against former President 
Hissein Habre m 1990 on Sudanese soil. 
However, cross-border incursions by Sudanese Janjaweed With Chadian allies (and oppo-
nents of the De by regime) grew more frequent. Chadian Zaghawa were reported to be mak-
ing cross-border raids to take revenge for attacks on their Sudanese brothers. Accordmg to 
senior government sources, this situation had the potential to degenerate into a regional 
interethnic war between a coalition of Arab groups and an alliance of other ethnic groups. 
There were also unconfirmed reports that Chadian opposition movements that had been 
silent for some years were rebmlding their bases in Sudan (in Kutum), and were obviously 
being tolerated by the Sudanese government. At the same time, there was great confusion 
about the organisation of and support for both oppositiOn movements m Darfur, the SLA 
(Sudanese Liberation Army) and the JEM (related to the fundamentalist movement headed 
by Hassan al-Tourabi). The Sudanese government accused Eritrea of supporting these 
groups. However, it was highly improbable that they could maintain their presence in the 
field and seemingly even gain strength without logistical and military support from the 
Chadian side. The NGO International Crisis Group (ICG) claimed to have documented 
arms deliveries from Chad to SLA and JEM rebels in Dar:fur m August. On the other hand, 
the government of Chad also supplied troops to the Sudanese army in Darfur, accordmg 
to UN sources. Khartoum, therefore, maintained positive diplomatic relations with 
N'Djamena. 
Chad became the lifeline for humamtarian aid to the estimated 2 million Darfuns dis-
placed by the conflict in western Sudan. Most humanitarian operations into Darfur com-
menced in eastern Chad. Consequently, stability in Chad was a major concern for the 
international community as a whole. The major foreign powers, France and the US, seem-
ingly had placed their bets on the regime ofldriss Deby, because there was no viable alter-
native, with the divided opposition and no strong individual candidate to oppose the 
regime. For the US, Chad was also an important component of its mid-term strategy to 
secure the supply of African crude oil to the US and to become less dependent on the 
Middle East. 
With the increasing threat of destabihsation in the eastern region, in August the French 
government decided to deploy 200 of its troops based in Chad ('forces pre-positionnees') 
to the country's eastern border to help prevent incursions by Janjaweed militia groups from 
Sudan's troubled Darfur region. It also made military transport planes and helicopters 
available to fly relief supplies to Sudanese refugee camps in eastern Chad, which were 
not accessible by road following heavy rains. France and the US were also strongly 
opposed to the spread of Sudanese influence in the region: France in order to counter Angle-
phone Influence in what it regarded as the Francophone sphere of influence, and the US 
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to tty to counter fundamentalist Islam, whnch they feared would spill over from Sudan into 
Chad and other countries. 
So-called 'liberators', the combatants who helped General Franvois Bozize seize power 
in Central African Republic (CAR) in 2003- some of them ofChadian origin -posed secu-
rity problems in Bangui (April). President Deby, the most important supporter of the new 
regime, and the Chadian ambassador m Bangui helped negotiate an agreement that included 
the transfer of some 200 ex-liberators to the common border. The Chadian contingent of 
120 men formed the backbone of the CEMAC peacekeeping troops in CAR. Additionally, 
some 27,000 refugees from CAR lived in southern Chad. 
Chad also became part of the war against terrorism mitiative sponsored by the US 
administration. Within the framework of the Pan Sahel Initiative, re-baptised Trans-Sahara 
Counter Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI), a large military counter-insurgency operation, insti-
gated by the Americans, was executed against a Sala:fist group ('Groupe Salafiste pour la 
Predication et le Combat' /GSPC) led by Amari Saifi in the north of the country. In March, 
this group was chased out of northern Mali into northeastern Niger and into the Tibesti 
regions of northern Chad. There, as many as 43 GSPC militants were killed. Their leader 
escaped but was captured in October by a Chadian rebel group ('Mouvement pour la 
Democratie et la Justice au Tchad' /MDJT). 
Socioeconomic Developments 
GDP for 2004 was estimated at $ 4.177 bn at current prices, $ 506 per capita and $ 1,627 
at purchasing power parity. However, the distribution of income was extremely unequal, 
with 7 million people living ofless than $ 1 a day. As a result of the oil project, Chad expe-
rienced an economic boom. Economic growth has been qmte high over the past years (up 
to 9% and 9.7% in 2003) following large-scale investments in oil exploitation in the Doba 
basin (the fields ofBolobo, Kome and Miandoun) by a consortium of three oil companies, 
Esso Exploration and Production Chad (EEPCI) comprising ExxonMobil ( 40% ), Chevron 
(25%) and the Malaysian group Petronas (35%). Estimated economic growth over 2004 
was between 30% and 40% ( + 30.8% according to IMF) with moderate and sometimes even 
negative inflation ( -5% in 2004, according to IMF), because of the start of oil exports. Over 
the second half of the year, almost $ 62 m were transferred to Chad. Per capita income was 
expected to double by 2005 as compared to the pre-oil situation. Yearly revenues from the 
three oilfields, estimated at 900 m barrels, were projected to amount to $ 200 m annually 
in the future at a production rate of225,000-250,000 barrels per day (the estimated rev-
enues per barrel of oil were only$ 2.5). 
In August, the World Bank's portfolio amounted to$ 330.9 m spread over nine active pro-
jects, with 33% in social sectors, 56% m infrastructure, energy and environment capacity 
building, 6% in agriculture and 5% in capacity building for the management of the oil econ-
omy. In May, the consortium of foreign oil companies indicated promising developments 
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in its search for additional oil resources in the area. In June, members of the consortium 
were awarded four new exploration permits in the Chari, Doseo and Salamat basins. They 
planned to start exploitation of three new oil fields in southern Chad by 2005 and 2006. 
A fourth oil field, Sedigi, north of Lake Chad, was still not exploited. It was planned to 
exploit this field and build a refinery in N'Djamena to provide fuel for the electricity sup-
ply of the capital. However, following the assassination of the main investor in the project 
in October 2003, these plans came to a standstill, despite the fact that a contract had been 
signed between the Chadian government and BID ('Banque Islamique de Developpment') 
for a loan of € 23 m for the construction of an electric power plant of 25 megawatts in 
Farcha. 
However, the management of oil revenues still posed many problems. Despite the 
influx of oil money, the government still had difficulties meeting its obligations. Payments 
to several international development projects were postponed. Salaries to civil servants 
were barely paid on time, leading to tensions between the president and the prime minis-
ter, his nephew Moussa F aki Mahamat. A large operation was launched to clean up the civil 
service and get rid of ghost civil servants, namely those who had long ceased working or 
had died and were still being paid. A similar operation was started in the armed forces, lead-
ing to considerable resentment, which may have contributed to the attempted coup 
d'etat (see above). 
World Bank programmes to build Chadian government capacity to manage the oil rev-
enues for development have lagged far behind the speed with which the oil project has been 
executed. The result was that the government has remained unprepared, whereas the 
World Bank had justified its involvement in the project based on its capacity to transform 
Chad's economy. Chadian authorities have announced a new three-year programme to 
enhance economic growth and reduce poverty. Good governance and increased trans-
parency were to be emphasised in the new oil producing country. There was quite some 
urgency required here, because international donors were growing impatient with the 
Chadian government. Following a mission to Chad, the IMF voiced severe criticisms in 
February and June of financial management and the transparency of the Chadian budget. 
It also imposed stiff conditions that would have to be met by government concerning finan-
cial management and macroeconomic policies before it would approve a new loan to 
restructure the state apparatus. By the end of the year, no decision to approve the loan had 
been taken. 
An important question is whether macroeconomic policies imposed by IMF and finan-
cial reforms will have any positive effect for the large majority (80%) of the population who 
inhabit the countryside. For the rural poor 2004 was a difficult year. After a good start, the 
rainy season ended prematurely, leading to large production losses. Chadian officials and 
FAO estimated the cereal harvest at around 1 m tonnes, about one-third lower than in 2003. 
Production of the most important cereal crops, millet and sorghum, may have declined by 
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40%. Up to the rainy season (June-August), cereal prices remained stable, though high, at 
the four major cereal markets. However, by the end of the rainy season in October prices 
started to rise at the markets of Sarh, Abeche, N'Djamena and Moundou compared to the 
preceding five years, because of low harvest expectations. In Moundou and Sarh, prices 
rose by 60% and 76%. An important additional cause for this price rise was the higher on-
farm price of cotton, which encouraged farmers to grow more cotton and fewer cereals. By 
November, it was clear that a food emergency was imminent, predominantly in Kanem, 
Batha, and the east and north, which were chronic deficit areas, but also in better endowed 
areas such as Guera, and Chari-Baguirmi. 
The Chadian medical infrastructure remained poor, with only one medical doctor for 
every 29,000 inhabitants. In 2004, major infectious diseases raged through the country. 
Cholera outbreaks in June in and around N'Djamena and in N'Djamena and Mongo in 
October infected more than 2,000 people, with many casualties, though an exact figure 
could not be established, statistics being very poor. 
The influx of refugees from Darfur over 16 months affected every aspect of the local pop-
ulation's livelihood base in the east of Chad. Initially, even inAbeche, the capital of the east, 
food prices did not rise despite the large influx. Apparently, refugees were fed from stocks 
at village level in the absence of food aid in the first months of their arrival. A nutrition sur-
vey conducted in May and June found Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) rates as high as 
29% among the host population and Severe Acute Malnutrition (SAM) was also reported, 
but these were not unusual phenomena in the Chadian countryside. More than 200,000 
refugees were registered in overcrowded camps and already in June alarming malnutrition 
and health problems were reported. The provision of water was a pressing problem, with 
water availability per capita being below international standards, even in the refugee camps. 
Poor rains, rapidly rising staple food prices owing to increased demand and the early deple-
tion oflast year's stocks, which local households had shared with refugees, led to increased 
competition for local resources, including water, firewood and wild foods. The disruption 
of trade with Sudan also had severe consequences for the east and the whole north of Chad. 
With the below-average harvest, the host population was becoming less tolerant of the 
perceived and real stresses created by the refugee population. Moreover, not all refugees 
in eastern Chad were in camps, and competed directly with the local populace for bush 
products. 
The price of sheep dropped, so that the exchange rate with cereals for livestock keepers 
declined. The supply oflivestock at the main markets was quite high after the rainy season 
because of the early cessation ofthe rains and the damage done by desert locusts in Kanem 
and Batha, though this damage was less than anticipated. Dry conditions this year have lim-
ited water and pasture availability. This, along with an increase in livestock diseases (report-
edly transferred from Sudanese animals to host livestock) put households' most important 
assets, their livestock, in danger. The transhumance movement towards the south had 
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already started m September in some areas, as compared to December ro better years. It was 
feared that this could lead to problems later m the season because of resource competition 
with local populations. 
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